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International Law and the United States Military Intervention in the
Western Hemisphere. By Max Hilaire. The Hague; Boston: Kluwer Law
International, 1997. 148 pages.
In InternationalLaw and the United States Military Intervention in
the Western Hemisphere, Max Hilaire, a member of the Department of
Political Science at Colgate University, traces the history of US military
intervention in the Western Hemisphere. In his book he examines Twentieth Century cases of American intervention in Guatemala, Cuba, Grenada, Nicaragua, Panama and the Dominican Republic within the context
of international law and concludes his study by looking at the United
States intervention in the post-Cold War era. Hilaire observes that essentially every relationship between the United States and its Latin American or Caribbean neighbor is in fact a hegemonic one.' He concludes
that, in true hegemonic fashion, the US continuously undermines the political sovereignty of its Latin American and Caribbean neighbors all in
the name of US regional security. Throughout this book, the dramatic
language and sometimes weak conclusions employed by Hilaire cannot
help but belie his true feelings that the United States' relationship with
2
its neighbors is nothing more than mere subordination.
In his introduction, Hilaire provides a historical background of
American and European intervention in the Western Hemisphere. He
notes that after declaring independence, the United States essentially
adopted a policy of non-intervention with an eye towards ridding the
Western Hemisphere of its European colonies. Hilaire writes that from
the creation of the Monroe Doctrine, the United States adopted a policy
of intervention in the Western Hemisphere to protect its national security
interests. 3 Hilaire concludes that the Monroe Doctrine effectively substituted American intervention for that of European intervention.
In his first chapter Hilaire turns his attention away from the failed
Monroe Doctrine to the evolution of other measures aimed at banning the
use of force and intervention in the Western Hemisphere. Of special importance is Hilaire's discussion of the Charter of the United Nations and
its impact on the states of Latin America and the Caribbean. The Charter
prohibits states from intervening in the domestic jurisdiction of other
states as well as from using threats of force inconsistent with the pur-

l. See

MAX HILAIRE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE UNITED STATES MILITARY INTER-

VENTION IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

vii-x (1997).

2. See id. at 5. In his discussion of intervention in Guatemala and Cuba, Hilaire
writes, "Guatemala became the first victim of United States anti-communist policy in the
Western Hemisphere."
3. See id. at 1.
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poses of the organization. The Charter makes only two exceptions to this
ban. Countries are permitted to use force against another nation or intervene in another nation's affairs: (1) in self-defense if an armed attack occurs; or (2) if an enforcement action is authorized by the UN Security
Council. Despite these very clear guidelines, this ban was regularly disre4
garded by the United States.
In Chapter Two, Hilaire demonstrates how the United States clearly
violated the ban with regard to Guatemala and Cuba. Hilaire posits these
two states as the first victims of indirect United States intervention in the
post-World War II era. During the 1950's and early 1960's, the United
States openly decided to intervene in the affairs of these two sovereign
nations to prevent the spread of communism into our hemisphere.5 Despite this open condemnation of communism by the US, preventing the
spread of communism was not an internationally sanctioned reason for
intervening in the affairs of other countries. Yet this did not prevent the
United States from training and arming Guatemalan rebels to undermine
the legitimate Arbenz government in 1954 or training and arming Cuban
rebels in the failed 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion. As Hilaire juxtaposes the
United Nations' edict against intervention and the use of force with the
United States' blatant disregard for that edict, Hilaire highlights the relative ineffectiveness and powerlessness of these bodies to condemn acts of
intervention. While Hilaire provides the popular arguments of the day
against the spread of communism put forth by Secretary of State John
Foster Dulles at the Tenth Inter-American Conference, 6 these arguments
do little to dissuade the reader or Hilaire himself that the United States
was in clear violation of international law. In concluding this chapter, Hilaire notes that the crises in Guatemala and Cuba legitimized the United
States' determination to establish its own regional rules to govern relations between itself and its "client" states in the Western Hemisphere.7

4. See id. at 19-21. Hilaire reminds readers that the United States has effectively undermined the legitimacy of these rules as one of the few violators of this ban. This blatant disregard by the United States largely contributes to Hilaire's view that America is a
hegemon, acting in total disregard of international law.
5. See generally id. at 23-54. Tacitly, it was Guatemala and Cuba's ties to the Soviet
Union that most worried the United States.
6. See id. at 32-33. The United States resolution drafted and maintained by Secretary of State Dulles stated, "[T]he domination or control of the political institutions of
any American state by the international communist movement, extending to this Hemisphere the political system of an extra-continental power would constitute a threat to the
sovereignty and political independence of the American states, endangering the peace of
America... " Id. at 34.
7. See id. at 54.

19981

BOOKS REVIEWED

In Chapters Three through Six, Hilaire examines the UN Charter
ban through case studies of US intervention in the Dominican Republic
in 1965, Grenada in 1983, Nicaragua in 1985 and Panama in 1989. Hilaire focuses particular attention on two justifications given by the United
States - protection of the intervening state's citizens and intervention by
invitation. Hilaire essentially dismisses both of these reasons as simply
after-the-fact justifications by the United States to mask its illegal actions. Moreover, Hilaire notes that the UN has not created any new exceptions to the UN Charter's ban on foreign military intervention. Essentially, Hilaire refuses to accept any United States justification for
intervention, despite strong evidence to the contrary. This ideological purity is one of the main weaknesses of Hilaire's book.
In dismissing these justifications Hilaire first turns his attention to
President Johnson's intervention in the Dominican Republic. Hilaire contends that President Johnson's deployment of Marines to the Dominican
Republic in 1965 was contrary to international law. Despite Johnson's
justification that such action was for the protection of American citizens,
Hilaire believes that this was an entirely political intervention. As the
President himself notes, the intervention in the Dominican Republic was
to prevent "the establishment of another communist government in the
Western Hemisphere." 8 For Hilaire this was the United States' only possible motivation for intervention. If American lives were really in imminent danger, why didn't President Johnson use diplomatic channels to secure the safety of his citizens? Moreover, if the United States was only
intervening militarily in the Dominican Republic to protect American
lives, why did the United States send so many troops to the Dominican
Republic with no limit on the length of their stay or their mission? To
Hilaire, the answer is clear. He concludes that US troops stayed in the
Dominican Republic to maintain law and order, to give protection to an
unpopular regime, and to prevent the victory of a communist
government.
Although Hilaire clearly believes that the US wrongly used the justification of "saving the lives of Americans" as a way to obtain public
support for its actions, the international community remains split on this
point. 9 Regardless, Hilaire undermines his own thesis in his discussion of

8. Id. at 65.
9. Id. at 60-61. Hilaire notes that some countries, such as the United States, have always believed that intervention to protect one's nationals is permitted under international
law. The states which adhere to this belief hold that intervention to protect one's nationals
has become customary international law. However, other states and legal scholars hold
that the UN Charter ban on the use of force and intervention includes a ban on the right
to intervene to protect an intervening state's citizens. Hilaire goes on to note that some
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the US intervention in Panama. While Hilaire decries that there was "no
indication that the lives of American nationals were in imminent danger

or . . .were targeted for abuse and harassment," 10 he quickly overlooks

the fact that one American was killed and another beaten in Panama during the same time period." In reconciling these contradictory statements,
one must remember Hilaire's bias. He views US intervention in the Western Hemisphere as both legally and morally wrong, regardless of the reasons. Throughout his book the United States is portrayed as the hegemon
and the states of Latin America and the Caribbean are portrayed as poor,
defenseless entities trying to maintain their right to self-determination.
Political views aside, it is indeed true that the United States had a number of motivations for intervening in Panama, including its economic interest in the peaceful operation of the Panama Canal and its dissatisfaction with Manuel Noriega. However, at the same time it is disingenuous
on the author's part to dismiss the danger to American nationals, simply
because their protection was not the United States only motivation for intervening in Panama.
The next justification which Hilaire rejects is that of intervention by
invitation. Once again the precise allowance of this measure under international law remains open to debate. Hilaire writes that the international
community generally agrees that a state which falls victim to an external
attack can request assistance from other states. However, the author finds
the US intervention by invitation in both Latin America and the Caribbean dubious at best. Hilaire cites accounts which grant the actual invitation subsequent to the intervention, as in the case of Grenada. Moreover,
Hilaire questions the legitimacy of many of the governments which extended the invitation to the United States. The author points out that
many of these "invitations" came from governments which hoped to stay
in power because of American intervention. Yet, Hilaire cannot accept
the proposition that a legitimate government needs to ask for help. He
proposes that if a "leader" has to ask for help, it consequentially implies
that the government is illegitimate. 2 This argument seems a little selfserving on the author's part. Hilaire uses the illegitimacy argument as an
easy way to find all US intervention by invitation illegal under international law.
In his final chapter Hilaire looks at US intervention in the post-Cold
War era and the new justifications for intervention. To this end he pro-

states believe that this right to intervene has survived the UN Charter's ban since there is
not an explicit prohibition against such action within the text of the Charter.
10. Id. at 116.
11. Id.
12. See id. at 63.
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vides a number of new "policy" reasons which the US is currently employing to explain its military involvement in the affairs of other countries. These modern justifications include intervention to stop drug
trafficking and intervention to maintain democracy. Of particular significance is Hilaire's discussion of intervention to prevent terrorism. Hilaire
writes that armed intervention to combat terrorism remains illegal under
international law and the UN Charter. 13 This discussion raises serious
questions as to the legality of the United States' recent attacks on terrorist bases in Afghanistan and Sudan.
Under Hilaire's analysis, the United States' attacks in Afghanistan
and Sudan would be considered illegal under international law and the
UN Charter. Yet, one must remember that there is no true consensus as
to what the Charter of the UN permits and does not permit. The legality
or illegality of a particular act really depends on a state's broad or narrow interpretation of Article 51. One must also recognize that the United
States holds the US Constitution to be its supreme law, and the provisions of the UN Charter would be subordinate to this document. Moreover, the International Court of Justice ("ICJ") does not wield great
power over the United States. This became quite evident when the
United States refused to recognize not only the Court's jurisdiction over
it, but also the Court's subsequent ruling against it in the 1986 case of
Nicaragua v. United States of America.1 4 The United States may face
censure from certain countries over these latest bombings, but the question of whether such attacks were in violation of international law remains unanswered.
Although Hilaire's analysis is at times self-serving, he nevertheless
provides the reader with a sound historical and political background for
US military involvement in the Western Hemisphere. Despite Hilaire's
exhaustive examination of the six cases of intervention outlined in his
book, the author does not entirely answer his own question regarding
which military interventions constitute a violation of international law.
However, what is clear from Hilaire's analysis is that the dictates of international law hold little restraint for a powerful country, such as the
United States, from asserting its will to protect its national interests in its
own hemisphere.
Kimberly S. L. Essary

13. See id. at 18. Under the UN Charter there are only two exceptions to the ban on
the use of force and intervention; (1) in self-defense, if an armed attack occurs (Art. 51),
and (2) enforcement action authorized by the Security Council (Art. 42).
14. See generally Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
(Nicaragua v. United States of America), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 103-123.

The Status of Palestinian Refugees in International Law. By Lex Takkenberg. Oxford: Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University Press,
1998. 411 pages.
Although a vast body of literature exists on the Arab-Israeli conflict,
surprisingly little has been written, from a legal perspective, on what author Lex Takkenberg calls the "human dimension" of the conflict - the
Palestinian refugees and their status under international law. In what began as a doctoral dissertation, Takkenberg analyzes refugee law, the law
relating to stateless persons, humanitarian law, and human rights law, to
uncover the legal protections to which Palestinian refugees are arguably
entitled. As a former legal officer for the Dutch Refugee Council and an
international staff member of the United Nations Relief and Works
Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East ("UNRWA"), Takkenberg brings his experience as both a legal practitioner and specialist
on Middle Eastern politics to shed light on the legal questions affecting
Palestinian refugees. His treatise is exceptionally useful because it comprehensively describes the unique legal consequences associated with being both a refugee and a stateless person under international law. Moreover, Takkenberg's work comes at an opportune time. If the recently
signed Wye Plantation Agreement fails to keep the peace process on
track, Palestinian refugees will most certainly require even greater international protection. On the other hand, if the agreement enables the permanent status negotiations to begin in May 1999 as originally intended
by the 1993 Oslo Accords, Takkenberg's analysis will be invaluable to
the search for a durable solution to the Palestinian refugee problem.
In order to determine the legal status of Palestinian refugees under
international law in a comprehensive manner, Takkenberg divides his
work into three parts and ten chapters. The first part explores the status
of Palestinian refugees under existing refugee law. To begin his analysis,
Takkenberg spells out his unique definition of Palestinian refugees. He
defines the group as "those Palestinians who fled that part of Mandate
Palestine which in 1948 became the state of Israel, as a result of the war
accompanying the establishment of that state, and who were subsequently
prevented from returning there - as well as their descendants."' At first
blush, Takkenberg's factual definition seems very broad. Upon closer examination, it is clear that the definition fails to include those Palestinians
who fled as a result of the Six Day War in 1967 or who were exiled as a
consequence of the 1990-91 Gulf War. Takkenberg himself notes these

1. LEx
49 (1998).
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exceptions, but fails to clearly articulate why he omits these Palestinians
even though they possess qualities of refugeehood - namely, the inability to return to their places of residence and the lack of diplomatic protection by their national government. Nevertheless, Takkenberg is quick
to point out that the Palestinians who do not fall within his definition are
often protected as stateless persons and individuals under international
law.
Aside from his own understanding of the term Palestinian refugee,
Takkenberg also explores several definitions employed by the international community. The meaning of "Palestinian refugee" as understood
by UNRWA, the United Nations agency largely responsible for the support and care of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians since 1949, has
special significance. As Takkenberg explains, Article D of the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees ("Convention") temporarily excludes
from the Convention's protection those Palestinians receiving assistance
or protection under UNRWA. However, once UNRWA's assistance and
protection ceases, those Palestinians who were previously excluded automatically become entitled to the benefits of the Convention. Thus, according to Takkenberg, the scope of UNRWA's mandate is critical because it necessarily determines who is entitled to benefits under the 1951
Convention for Palestinian refugees. Given that UNRWA assistance and
relief under the 1951 Convention are mutually exclusive, one could reasonably ask which instrument provides the best protection? Although
Takkenberg does not explicitly address this question, his thorough analysis suggests that neither provided sufficient legal protection for most Palestinian refugees due to varying interpretations of both instruments and
general problems with enforcement. UNRWA never pretended to adopt a
legal theory but continually revised its mandate according to exigent circumstances. Remarkably, though, Takkenberg explains that Article D was
originally motivated by the desire of the Arab states to ensure that the
Palestinian refugees would not get lost among the rest of the 1951 Convention refugees In other words, the Arab countries believed that Palestinians would be better served if they remained the special responsibility
of the United Nations.
After concluding that Palestinian refugees are unsatisfactorily protected under international refugee law, Takkenberg logically turns to
other areas of international law to determine what protections Palestinian
refugees may derive under these sources. Part Two of the book is devoted exclusively to examining the law relating to stateless persons, humanitarian law and human rights law. Takkenberg argues that the crux of
the Palestinian refugee problem is largely related to their status as stateless persons. Many of the vulnerabilities shared by Palestinian refugees
- not having a passport of a state, not having at least the theoretical op-
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tion of returning to their original residence, and not having an internationally recognized "nationality" with all of its protections - could be
solved by the establishment of a Palestinian state. Unfortunately, the political compromises that would have to be made to realize this solution
seem increasingly distant. Nonetheless, Takkenberg concludes that in order to create an enduring peace in the Middle East, solutions for these
problems will have to be found.
In Chapter Six, Takkenberg successfully demonstrates that international humanitarian law provides some protection for those Palestinian
refugees who have been frequently subjected to armed conflict. In particular, those Palestinians who sought refuge in the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip and came under Israeli occupation after 1967 are not only refugees but also persons protected by international humanitarian law. Most
of the international community, including Israel, agrees that these Palestinians are protected under the 1907 Hague Resolutions. However, unlike
most other countries, Israel disputes the fact that the Fourth Geneva Convention applies to Palestinians living in the occupied territories. Thus,
these Palestinians, although likely entitled to the full protections of the
Fourth Geneva Convention, have not been able to enjoy them.
Under the label of human rights law in Chapter Seven, Takkenberg
explores the international agreements that recognize the rights of all individuals and the applicability of these agreements to the Palestinian refugee problem. Takkenberg persuasively demonstrates that the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR") identifies a right to
return and compensation, although the extent to which it applies to the
Palestinians is hotly debated. The ICCPR also establishes a right to selfdetermination, which when applied to the Palestinians may alleviate
statelessness, one of the most difficult problems shared by the refugees.
The creation of an independent Palestine would provide the refugees with
a nationality and with a place to which to return if they so desire.
Finally, Takkenberg devotes Part Three of his book to the implementation of the standards of treatment that he believes Palestinian refugees deserve under international law. He argues that the international
community has an obligation to provide protection to Palestinian refugees
by virtue of the fact that they, as with all refugees, cannot turn to the
government of their home country for protection. Further, Takkenberg
identifies an implied obligation of the international community to find
durable solutions to refugee problems because, as a basic human rights
principle, every person in entitled to a nationality. 2 While many international refugee problems are solved either through voluntary repatriation,

2. See id. at 177.

local integration, or resettlement in third countries, Takkenberg recognizes that a solution to the Palestinian refugee problem will likely have
to employ all three options. Compensation for Palestinian, as well as
Jewish refugees who were forced to flee Arab countries after the creation
of Israel, will also be necessary.
Takkenberg's book arrives at a politically sensitive and tense moment in Arab-Israeli relations as the peace process that began in 1993 is
struggling to survive. His rich analysis of numerable sources of international law clarifies the complex legal status of Palestinian refugees.
While Israeli and Palestinian decisionmakers will likely benefit from Takkenberg's thoughtful interpretations of international law, they should also
heed his warning that the application of legal principles cannot, by itself,
solve the underlying issues. Although the Wye Agreement signals that
differences over Israeli security issues and Palestinian efforts to combat
terrorism can be overcome, even more difficult challenges lie ahead. At
this point it is uncertain whether both parties can compromise in order to
create a lasting and just peace. However, if both parties do not try to
reach a lasting solution, we are all sure to lose in the long run.
Hebba Hassanein

War Crimes Against Women: Prosecution in International War Crimes
Tribunals. By Kelly Dawn Askin. Cambridge, Mass.: Kluwer Law International, 1997. 455 pages.
In War Crimes Against Women: Prosecution in International War
Crimes Tribunals, Volume I in a two-part series,' author Kelly Dawn Askin examines the historical development of international humanitarian
and human rights law and its relation to gender-specific war crimes. Specifically, Askin argues that although the international community has received ample documentation of these gender-related crimes, it has almost
universally ignored pressure for action. Although courts in every country

1. KELLY DAWN ASKIN, WAR CRIMES AGAINST WOMEN: PROSECUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS xiii (1997) [hereinafter Askin, Prosecutions in International War Crimes]. In the preface, the author notes that this book is the first of a twopart series. Id. The author anticipates that Volume II of the series, KELLY DAWN AsKIN &
PATRICIA VISEUR-SELLERS, WAR CRIMES AGAINST WOMEN: PROSECUTION OF GENDER

(forthcoming), will
contain a more detailed analysis of the Yugoslav and Rwandan War Crimes Tribunals.
CRIMES IN THE YUGOSLAVIA AND RWANDAN WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS

(421)
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regularly prosecute perpetrators of such violence, international courts
have provided no such protection for women. As a result, Askin believes
that the international community should recognize gender-specific crimes
as a violation of international humanitarian law. She believes that this is
the only way to assure that the international community will give these
crimes the attention and the resources necessary to prevent further violence against women. To aid in that endeavor, Askin proposes that the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia should prosecute gender-related crimes committed during the Balkan conflict. She believes that the Tribunal possesses the power and the necessary authority
to end the glaring omissions of the past and aid in future criminal trials
at the national and international level.
In Chapter One, Askin traces the laws of warfare from 500 B.C. until the Second World War. Specifically, she turns her attention to the legal and societal treatment of sexual violence against women. Askin begins her analysis in the United States during the Civil War. In that war,
the United States took the first step in codifying international customary
laws of land warfare.2 Regarding sexual assault, the Lieber Code of 1863
mandated, "[A]ll rape . . . [is] prohibited under the penalty of death." 3
One year later, international delegates met at the first Geneva Convention, laying the groundwork for what was to become the humanitarian
law movement. 4 The author also discussed the Hague Conventions of
1899 and 1907 with particular emphasis on the 1907 Convention which
gave particular protection to women regarding "family honour and
rights."' 5 Askin ends the chapter with an analysis of the failure of the
World War I War Crimes Commission to prosecute any war criminals for
the violation of women's rights. However, she does credit the Commission with including rape and forced prostitution in their report on the violation of the laws and customs of war committed by the Axis powers.
Chapter Two, "Gender Specific Crimes in WWII," provides graphic
testimony of the victims and eyewitnesses of wartime sexual assault.

2. See Askin, Prosecutions in International War Crimes, supra note 1, at 36. This
code, drafted by Frances Lieber in 1863 as General Orders No. 100, was derived from international custom and usage and became the official U.S. Army regulation guide on the
laws of land warfare. Id.
3. Id. at 36.
4. Id. at 37. "Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick of Armed Forces in the Field" (22 Aug. 1864), 129 CTS 361 (Parry,
ed.); 22 Stat. 940; 1 Bevans 7.
5. Id. at 40. "Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land"
(First Hague, II), (29 July 1899), 32 Stat. 1803, T.S. No. 403 (entered into force 4 Sept.
1900); "Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land" (Second Hague,
IV), (18 Oct. 1907), 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539 (entered into force 26 Jan. 1910).
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These eyewitness accounts illustrate a wide range of gender-related violence including the crimes of rape, forced prostitution, forced sterilization, forced abortion, and infanticide. Askin uses this eyewitness testimony to demonstrate that violence based on gender is as repugnant as
any based on race, religion, ethnicity, political affiliation, or nationality.
In Chapters Three and Four, Askin discusses the events leading to
Nuremberg and the Nuremberg Trial itself. The Charter for the International Military Tribunal ("IMT") at Nuremberg was an important step
because it included two new classes of crimes that had not previously
been seen in international law - namely, the "Crimes Against Peace"
and the "Crimes Against Humanity."' 6 Although these two new classes of
crimes represented an important step in international humanitarian justice,
neither of these two crimes specifically included rape. As a result, Askin
writes that gender-related crimes remained undifferentiated from the other
atrocities of wartime. Although complainants provided for the IMT numerous reports of torturous rape, forced prostitution, forced sterilization,
forced abortion, pornography, sexual mutilation, and sexual sadism; the
prosecution did not try any of these crimes or publicly document these
atrocities. Once again, the world was left with no legal precedent for the
wartime prosecution gender-specific crimes.
In Chapter Five, Askin discusses the International Military Tribunal
for the Far East, or the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal. 7 The Tokyo War
Crimes Tribunal followed the Nuremberg Trial by six months. The Tokyo
Tribunal relied upon much of the precedent established by the Nuremberg
Trial. However, the Tokyo Charter did charge counts of rape in the indictment, despite the fact that the crime was not specifically enumerated.
These charges were included under "inhuman treatment," "ill treatment," and "failure to respect family honour and rights." In contrast to
the Nuremberg Tribunal, the Tokyo Tribunal documented rape crimes in
the public record. Askin believes this was not enough. She argues that
there was "abundant notice" following World War I that sexual assault

6. See Askin, Prosecution in International War Crimes, supra note 1, at 117.
"Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European
Axis", London, 8 August 1945 [hereinafter, the London Agreement] 8 UNTS 279; 59
Stat. 1544, 8 AS No. 472. Attached to the London Agreement is the "Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Annexed to the London Agreement" , 8 August 1945,
[hereinafter Charter of the IMT]. "Crimes Against Peace" and "Crimes Against Humanity" can be found in Charter of the IMT, Ch. II,Art. 6.
7. See Askin, Prosecutions in International War Crimes, supra note 1, at 165. "International Military Tribunal for the Far East," Proclaimed at Tokyo, 19 January 1946
and amended 26 April 1946, TIAS No. 1589 (entered into force 19 January 1946)[hereinafter "IMTFE"], Annex, Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East
(Tokyo) [IMTFE Charter or Tokyo Charter.].
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during war was foreseeable. 8 As a result, for the second time in a halfcentury the testimony and records of wartime sexual assaults were neglected, the victims of sexual assault remained unrecognized, and those
responsible for the atrocities remained unprosecuted.
In Chapter Six, Askin analyzes the evolution of women's rights in
domestic and international law. She argues that as women have gained
access to political, educational, and economic rights, the international
laws have begun to reflect their contributions. The author cites the "Women's Convention" and the "Declaration Against Violence" as international accords addressing women's issues. However, the author also criticizes these documents for their lack of remedial and enforcement
mechanisms. Askin also believes that the international community has
made very little progress toward preventing wartime sexual assault. Specifically, she mentions the Fourth Geneva Convention. Of the 459 articles of the Convention, only one sentence in Article 27 expressly prohibits rape and forced prostitution.9
In Chapters Seven and Eight, Askin focuses her attention on the
possibility of dramatic change in the prohibition, prosecution, and punishment of wartime abuses against women with the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.' 0 The Balkan
conflict can be set apart from other wars in its manipulation and abuse of
the female gender to further ethnic cleansing and genocide. During that
conflict, Askin notes that women were raped, forcibly impregnated, and
forced into sexual slavery in the name of ethnic purity. Although this
may well be characterized as an age-old conflict based on religion and
ethnicity, nonetheless women bore a heavy toll of violence based strictly
on their gender. To that end, Askin believes the ICTY holds great promise for the protection of women from rape and sexual assault during
times of armed conflict.
First, Askin argues that the Tribunal clearly has jurisdiction over
sexual assault during time of armed conflict. As support, she explores the

8. See Askin, Prosecutions in International War Crimes, supra note 1, at 203.
9. Id. at 260 n.859.
10. In SC Res. 808 (Feb. 22, 1993), the UN Security Council called for the establishment of an international tribunal. hence the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia ("ICTY") was established pursuant to SC Res. 827 (May 25, 1993) to
prosecute "Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991." UN Doc S/25704
(May 3, 1993) contains the "Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of
the Security Council Resolution 808" (1993). The Statute of the ICTY is attached to the
Secretary-General's report in UN Doc S/25704, Annex 91993) [hereinafter Yugoslav Tribunal Statute]. See Askin, Prosecutions in International War Crimes, supra note 1, at 7
n.15.
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statutory jurisdiction of the Yugoslav Tribunal. She begins her analysis
with Article 2 of the Yugoslav Statute which provides for jurisdiction
over "grave breaches" of the Geneva Convention of 1949.1" Although
neither sexual assault nor rape was specifically listed as a "grave
breach," Askin argues that sexual assault falls within the purview of several of the enumerated grave breaches within the Convention - namely,
torture or inhuman treatment, and willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health.
Furthermore, Askin notes that many Articles of the Yugoslav Statute
would also appear to cover these gender-related crimes. Of particular
note to Askin is Article 3 of the Yugoslav Statute, "Violations of the
Laws or Customs of War." 12 She argues that because rape has long been
prohibited by conventional or customary law, it could reasonably be
prosecuted under international law. The author also considers Article 4 of
the Yugoslav Statute, "Genocide."' 3 She argues that sexual assault meets
the elements of genocide when committed in systematic, massive proportions in an attempt to destroy a particular group or when committed to
harm a single woman who is part of a protected group. Askin argues that
the Genocide Convention should protect gender as it does religion,
ethnicity, race, or nationality.
Finally, Askin assesses the likelihood that sexual assault might be
prosecuted under Article 5, "Crimes Against Humanity." 14 In her analysis, she probes the weaknesses of Article 5. That Article lists "enslavement, imprisonment, torture, rape, persecution on political, racial and religious grounds, etc.," as crimes that can be prosecuted as crimes against
humanity.' 5 Despite the expanded definition of criminal acts under this
Article, Askin argues that the statutory language still has inherent weaknesses which could prevent a successful prosecution. She notes that the
statutory language requires that a crime be "committed against a civilian
population during an armed conflict." 1 6 This requirement would seem to
exclude a number of commonly violated populations. Moreover, it is
doubtful whether Article 5 would protect women in combat or women
who experience sexual assaults before or following an armed conflict.

11. See Yugoslav Tribunal Statute, supra note 10. See also Askin, Prosecutions in
International War Crimes, supra note 1, at 298.
12. See Askin, Prosecutions in International War Crimes, supra note 1, at 299.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 300.
15. Id. In order to be prosecuted, these crimes must be committed during times of
armed conflict against a civilian population.

16. Id.

Overall, War Crimes Against Women: Prosecution in International
War Crimes Tribunals provides a sobering view of how the international
community has failed to acknowledge, prosecute, or punish crimes
against women during times of war. Despite overwhelming evidence of
gender-motivated crimes this century, the international community has repeatedly failed to protect women's most basic rights. This inaction has
left past and present victims of gender-specific crime with little more
than guilt and a sense of grave injustice.
Readers should be aware of the graphic testimony of sexual abuse
and sexual assault by victims. Author Kelly Dawn Askin thoroughly details the crimes committed against women before, during, and after
armed conflict. Although these testimonials are useful for demonstrating
the injustice of allowing the perpetrators of such crimes to go unprosecuted, the numerous accounts can overwhelm the reader. These accounts
distract the reader's attention from the real legal arguments. Had the author simply limited the amount of victim testimony to the most poignant
examples, her cogent legal analysis would have shone more brightly.
In her conclusion, the author provides the reader with a sense of
hope for the future as she discusses the Rwandan and Yugoslav Tribunals' efforts to address women's issues and redress sexual assault crimes.
Through the author's overwhelming historical evidence and enthusiastic
advocacy of her cause, the reader feels assured that this time the tribunals "will go a long way toward replacing aggressive17 denial with aggressive pursuit of women's issues and gender crimes."
Trish L Hessel

The Effectiveness of UN Human Rights Institutions. By Patrick James
Flood. Westport, Conn.: Praeger Publishers, 1998. 166 pages.
While many legal scholars, political activists and social commentators have struggled in vain to pen the clearest, most comprehensive definition of human rights, the totalitarian systems of our century have
proven the ultimate consequence of abandoning the endeavor. In The Effectiveness of UN Human Rights Institutions, Patrick James Flood succinctly articulates the identity of human rights and human dignity in a
contemporary social and political context. Drawing on his broad-based
knowledge, gained as the former officer in charge of human rights affairs
17. Id. at 379
(426)
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at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations in Geneva, Flood offers a historical perspective on the international community. He focuses on how it,
through the United Nations ("UN"), influences the global community's
observation of fundamental, yet equivocal, human rights standards.
Flood's opening chapter pronounces the normative political and legal
value of continuing a visible and viable discussion of human rights. The
Introduction provides guidance concerning the historical backdrop of
human rights issues, key terms and their usage, as well as the author's
personal background. Basic questions and general propositions regarding
his examination of UN human rights institutions are also included.
In Chapter Two, Flood examines the notion of human rights, how
the concept entered the language of political discourse in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and how it gradually became an international prescriptive and behavioral norm. Flood begins by tracing the
evolution of human rights. Its genesis, he explains, was as a part of the
natural law tradition in Rome. This interpretation of human rights incorporated the concept of intrinsic human dignity. However, it lacked the
understanding that dignity gave rise to individual rights. Its contemporary
formulation, he argues, is a way of expressing the requirements of human
dignity in a social context and of safeguarding respect for that dignity.
Flood's emphasizes that the discussion of human rights should not
only take place within the realm of practical application. It should also
be marked for theoretical consideration. The author observes that it is
often only during times of international crisis that the topic of international human rights is broached. To prove this point, he examines the
historical record of the human rights debate; a debate that intensified during the American and French Revolutions, slavery and the Second World
War-times when massive assaults on human dignity were apparent-and
waned during the peaceful years in between.
Chapter Three surveys and analyzes the existing system of UN
human rights institutions. Flood deals, more specifically, with the operational advantages and disadvantages of the two types of UN human
rights implementation machinery: treaty-based programs and charterbased mechanisms. Treaty-based human rights programs, which Flood
concludes are ineffective, find their authority in a specific intergovernmental agreement that covers a specific subject. These programs bind
only those states that have become a party to the agreement. The much
broader charter-based mechanisms, which derive their authority from
human rights and general provisions of the UN charter, bind all member
states of the UN. These mechanisms and are, by Flood's account, more
politically meaningful than their treaty-based counterparts.
Flood divides charter-based human rights institutions into two categories: thematic and country-specific mechanisms. In the next two chap-
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ters, Flood explores two thematic human rights mechanisms. The premise
of the thematic institution is that the international community of states,
acting in a legislative capacity, can establish a device to insure that all
states promote, observe and protect a single, identified right or theme.
Conversely, country-specific mechanisms, discussed in Chapters Six and
Seven, allow the international collective to mandate that one specified
country improve its human rights practices.
Chapter Four, "The Working Group on Enforced Disappearances,"
presents the first of two case studies illustrating thematic institutions. In
this chapter, the author delves into the UN's reaction to Argentina's clandestine detention, mistreatment, and often summary execution of millions
of that State's own citizens and residents. Forced disappearance, which
was practiced by certain Western countries in the 1970's, is a multiple
human rights violation. Abduction and detention is not only an arbitrary
deprivation of liberty, but it is also a denial of judicial due process.
The UN responded with the creation of the Working Group on Enforced Disappearances("Working Group"). The Working Group was set
up to assist families and to determine the fate and whereabouts of their
missing relatives. Made up of five representatives from member states of
the Human Right Commission, the Working Group sent communications
demanding information from governments about the location and status
of persons believed to have been abducted by official forces. Flood concludes that this first of the charter-based "thematic" mechanisms made a
valuable contribution to the diminution of the practice of disappearances
by the Argentine military regime. He states that this effectiveness was
largely a result the Working Group's rapid intercession.
Flood continues his exploration of thematic institutions in Chapter
Five by investigating the UN's response to religious bigotry. The atrocities committed during the Second World War against entire religious.
communities led to the first incorporation of religious freedom as a fundamental human right. This response took the form of The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and later, the International Covenant on
Civil and PoliticalRights. The focus of the chapter, however, is a discussion of the effectiveness of the Human Rights Commission's ("HRC")
appointment of Angelo Vidal d'Almeida Ribeiro as Special Rapporteur
on the Elimination of Religious Discrimination and Intolerance.
Ribeiro, who was charged with seeking reliable and creditable information from governments, specialized agencies and intergovernmental organizations, examined and reported to the HRC incidents and actions inconsistent with the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. Flood concludes that the effectiveness of the thematic institution
of Special Rapporteurs is dependent largely upon the Rapporteur's per-
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sonality. In this case, Flood explains, Ribeiro's passive personality led to
a significantly diminished effect on religious intolerance.
In the next chapter, Flood changes his focus from a thematic focus
to a country-specific platform. Titled "Special Rapporteur on Chile,"
Chapter Six discusses the UN country-specific human rights mechanism
employed to press the Chilean military government to halt human rights
abuses in the early 1970's. In September 1973, armed forces, led by
General Augusto Pinochet, initiated a bloody coup, followed by a period
of repression so massive and violent that it quickly put the Chilean
human rights situation on the global agenda. During the months following the uprising there were hundreds of disappearances,' widespread torture, and thousands of arbitrary arrests. Flood concludes that over time
and together with other domestic and international factors, the UN made
important contributions to the evolution of the human rights situation in
that country and also influenced Chile's willingness to cooperate with the
international community.
The Chilean authorities became aware that being singled out by the
UN and the international community could lead to extreme diplomatic
isolation. Moreover, Chile believed that the UN and UN member states
might institute economic sanctions. Recognizing that the UN human
rights structure and campaign were an integral and important part of its
external environment, the Chilean military government sought to accommodate the organization.
As was true in the case of Chile, human rights practices in Iran became an issue of international scrutiny following the seizure of power by
a radical regime. In Iran's case, the regime was lead by the Ayatollah
Khomeini. Chapter Seven considers another UN country-specific human
rights mechanism. Under rule by Islamic fundamentalists, Iran saw Jews,
Christians and Zoroastrians persecuted and forced to flee the country for
fear of severe punishment and brutality. In response, the UN appointed a
Special Rapporteur on Iran.
As Flood asserts in Chapter Six, the personality of the Rapporteur is
often the determining factor of whether the system is effective. In the
case of Iran, this was particularly true. Unlike the Chilean government,
the Iranian establishment mounted considerable opposition to UN intervention in the early 1980's. This made the presence of a Rapporteur with
a patient and persevering character crucial.

1. The UN Working Group on Chile determined that at least 600 disappearances occurred during 1973-79. Most of these took place in the first year or two of the Pinochet
regime.

Flood is not so quick to attribute the success of this mission to the
quality of the Rapporteur, however. Sometimes the political climate
changes, thereby opening a country to the influence of external forces. In
early 1989, the Ayatollah Khomeini called for the execution of Salman
Rushdie for the ideas contained within his book Satanic Verses. Flood
notes that after the death of Khomeini, Iran was willing to offset some of
the unusually strong negative international reactions to the Rushdie case
by cooperating with the UN in the early 1990's. With the succession of
the moderate Heshemi Rafsanjani to the Presidency, Iran got that chance.
Flood acknowledges that the Human Rights Commission and the Special
Rapporteur were important contributing factors to the UN's success in the
case of Iran.
In the end, The Effectiveness of UN Human Rights Institutions offers
an excellent foundation for a more detailed understanding of international
human rights issues. Flood provides an in depth analysis of many mechanisms used by our world's primary peace keeping organization. For those
interested in seeing the exact provisions which grant the UN power to
create these human rights institutions, the author provides them in the appendix. At times, painfully technical prose may confuse those unfamiliar
with the United Nations and human rights issues. However, discriminating readers will complete the book with a clear understanding of the outlined topics. The Effectiveness of UN Human Rights Institutions provides
an enjoyable introduction to the operations of the United Nations.
Essentino A. Lewis, Jr

The World Trade Organization: Constitution and Jurisprudence. By John
H. Jackson. London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1998.
193 pages.
For the past fifty years world economics have been shaped substantially by the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs ("GATT"). On
January 1, 1995 the World Trade Organization ("WTO") came into existence, marking the beginning of another potentially significant development in the history of world trade. While the WTO did not replace
GATT, it did attempt to provide a remedy to the procedural regulations
that were lacking in GATT. With its emphasis on procedural rules, most
importantly its Dispute Settlement Process ("DSP"), the WTO is successfully resolving international trade conflicts where earlier agreements
failed.
(430)
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In The World Trade Organization: Constitution and Jurisprudence,
Georgetown law professor John J. Jackson, a leading authority on international trade law, presents a thoughtfully concise report on the institutional structure of the WTO. His analysis focuses on the new legal structure that the WTO brings to world trade through its methods of solving
international trade conflicts. More specifically, Jackson examines how the
WTO is effectively using the binding international legal authority of the
DSP to resolve complicated trade disputes between member nations.
Following an overview in Chapter One, Jackson proceeds in Chapter
Two by chronicling the history of GATT as a way of understanding the
purpose of the WTO. GATT was born out of post-World War II efforts to
peacefully avoid international armed conflicts. When the drafting nations
met in New York in 1946, they shared the belief that economic affairs
affect the likelihood of armed conflict between nations. GATT was
formed with the intention of restricting governments from imposing various tariffs and restraints on international trade in an effort to reduce the
possibility of armed conflict. It is to this end that GATT has had its
greatest success. Despite this success, however, GATT had inherent
flaws. Foremost, it lacked a constitution which could regulate its organizational activities and procedures. Additionally, its members were not
bound by the findings or rulings made by GATT. As a result, members
of GATT lacked the ability to discipline countries that violated its international laws and treaties. Out of this need for a system that could bring
legal structure to international trade, the WTO was formed.
Chapter Three describes the WTO's constitutional provisions which
govern the organization and its member nations. These provisions provide
the legal structure that is the basis for the WTO; such provisions were
noticeably absent from GATT. While GATT allowed nations to pick and
choose which constitutional provisions they wanted to adopt, the WTO
advances a "single-package concept." 1 As of May 1998, the 132 signatory nations to the WTO had adopted all of the substantial portions of
the constitution in order to gain membership. This affords the WTO the
authority to resolve disputes based upon mutually agreeable regulations.
While this book is focused on the structure of the WTO, Jackson also
outlines the text annexed by the WTO.
The substance of the WTO is contained in four Annexes. The Annexes contain copies of adopted international agreements such as GATT,
the General Agreement on Trade in Service, the Agreement on Trade-

1. The WTO requires member nations to adopt all the substantial parts of its constitution, including the DSP which binds the signatory nations to the WTO decisions. This
binding authority provides the WTO with an enforcement mechanism, previously absent
from GATE
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Related Intellectual Property, the DSP, and the Trade Policy Review
Mechanism. By contrast, the Charter contains the procedural and institutional matters that govern the agreements contained in the Annexes.
The organizational structure of the WTO provides a better legal
method for resolving international trade conflicts than did the old GATT
model. Besides the top governing councils which are similar to those
used under GATT, the WTO provides a decision making body in the
form of the Dispute Settlement Body ("DSB"). Nothing as comprehensive as the DSB existed under GAT. While some of the GATT provisions did call for settlement methods, the WTO procedures now trump
any of the limited methods supplied by the GAIT provisions.
Chapter Four addresses the DSB which constitutes the heart of the
WTO. Jackson begins by explaining how the DSB could have easily
evolved into a far different body. Originally, the DSB was understood as
being purely advisory. Later, the purpose of the DSB came to be viewed
as resolving trade disputes and enforcing the Annexes. Jackson believes
that the later understanding is most beneficial for the long-term health of
the organization because it forces participating members to comply with
the rules of the WTO or face punitive compliance or compensation measures. By maintaining an objective, legal approach through the use of an
appointed panel, the WTO hopes to promote respect and stability in the
international economic system.
The Dispute Settlement Body aims to provide four elements that
were previously lacking under GAT. These include: (1) a unified system
for settling all international trade disputes; (2) greater consideration for
all parts of the Uruguay Round; (3) the right of an aggrieved government
to a hearing before the panel; and (4) the right to an appellate body
review.
Jackson attributes the success of the DSB to the legally binding effect that the rulings have on the signatory nations. However, while members of the WTO must comply with the organization's rulings, the body
of law does not become part of each member's domestic laws. Despite
this, Jackson believes that the rulings of the DSB will eventually effect
the domestic jurisprudence of the signatory nations.
The book concludes in Chapter Five with a summary of the WTO's
significance in international law. In his opinion, Jackson believes that the
success of the WTO could have sown the seeds of its own demise. As
the success of the WTO grows and the signatory nations agree to expand
the scope of the WTO, there is some question as to whether the system
will be able to process the increased number of complaints. In addition,
some nations have already expressed an interest in developing rules for
new areas of law including laws which affect antitrust, environmental,
and investment. Finally, the WTO will also continue to face the difficulty

of encouraging nations to cede some sovereignty to an international organization. This act of faith carries with it a level of trust which many
nations are unwilling to bestow upon any organization, foreign or
domestic.
Overall, Jackson's The World Trade Organization: Constitution and
Jurisprudence is effective in illuminating the theoretical differences between the old system under GATT and the new system under the WTO.
It also provides a thorough and lucid inspection of the structure of the
WTO. While the institutional structure of the system is well understood,
the practical effects of the WTO are yet to be fully realized. As time
passes, foreign crises will surely test the resolve of this member-based
organization. If conflicting nations respect the rulings of the WTO, its legal authority will guide the future of international trade. Only then will
we fully comprehend the true benefits or harms of the world's first constitutional deliberative body of trade.
Stephen Reichert

Cartels of the Mind: Japan's Intellectual Closed Shop. By Ivan P. Hall.
New York: W.W. Norton & Company Press, 1998. 198 pages.
In the post-Cold War era, the United States has adopted globalization as a guiding force in its struggle to redefine its political and business
relationship with other countries of the world.
The term has been infused into many levels of American discourse,
and today it radiates with connotations of opportunity, success and fortune. Ostensibly, the idea of the world as a vast, open market for investment, education, and democratic development seems like the perfect way
to rebuild alliances with countries once perceived as Cold War "villains." In practice, however, the concept has proven to have inherent
stumbling blocks. In Cartels of the Mind: Japan's Intellectual Closed
Shop, author Ivan P. Hall explores these stumbling blocks as he provides
an in depth look at different American business sectors and their relationship with Japan. 1 Through his factual accounts of American legal professionals, journalists, academics, and research students in Japan, Hall examines the institutional and legal blockades that have historically faced
foreigners in that country. As Hall demonstrates, these blockades, com-

1. IvAN P. HALL, CARTELS OF THE MIND (1998) [hereinafter Cartels].
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monly dismissed or ignored by outsiders, are really symptomatic of the
deep-seated biases and beliefs of this closed culture. Such beliefs, he
rightly concludes, ultimately raise the barriers to a truly global interchange of ideas and commerce.
Hall readily admits that Cartels bypasses the normal "tip-toeing-oneggshells" approach that so many American commentators have taken
when analyzing the US-Japanese relationship. Instead, Cartels critically
examines the self-protectionist policies of a country struggling to keep its
own identity. He does so by probing into the laws that Japanese legislatures, shaped by a unique Japanese culture, have produced. Such an approach results in an insightful, intelligent and thought-provoking framework from which to think about the assumptions and consequences
underlying any international trade or business issue.
Cartels is divided into five chapters. In Chapters One through Four,
Hall examines the experiences of each American professional group attempting to engage in a professional relationship in Japan. In recounting
these experiences, he probes into what he terms the Japanese intellectual
"cartel".2 Hall argues that this Japanese set of "perceptions, assumptions,
motivations, ideological constraints, and institutional arrangements" perpetuates a narrow exclusionary mindset among the Japanese with whom
American professionals come in contact. 3 For each profession, he cites
examples of Japanese laws which provide barriers to American professionals looking to become a participant in the Japanese culture. 4 Furthermore, Hall criticizes Japan's continual failure to provide reciprocal opportunities. Because the themes are consistent throughout each
profession, only the legal issues and conclusions will be examined here.
In Chapter One, "Legal Landing," Hall recounts the history of Japan's discriminatory employment laws and its consequences for American lawyers attempting to practice law in the Japanese legal community.
In 1949, during the American occupation of Japan, seventy-three foreign
lawyers, mostly American, were licensed to practice in Japan. Both the
Japanese and American governments thought the arrangement would
prove symbiotic. The Japanese government believed that the presence of
American attorneys in Japan would bring more business into the country.
The American government believed that its presence in Japan would be

2. Id. at 20.
3. See id. at 12.
4. The laws affecting the legal profession make up the focus of this review. However, it is important to note that Cartels does discuss exclusionary laws affecting other
professions. These include the strict government control and influence over the foreign
press, and visa requirements that make it nearly impossible for foreign professors to gain
tenure at a Japanese university. See id. at 65-75, 97-100, respectively.
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the first step towards developing strong business and democratic ties to
that country. Unfortunately, these dreams never reached fruition.
By 1955, Japan's new independence proved discouraging to each
government's expectation of a beneficial symbiotic relationship. From
1955 to 1986 Japan's legal climate changed and Japan's pursuit of a new
identity successfully closed the door on any ambitious American lawyer
seeking a long-term legal career in Japan. American lawyers could not
establish any type of legal practice that would create significant competition to the Japanese firms. The reality of such a discriminatory law hit
home for Americans in 1977 when a New York lawyer attempted to open
a foreign law office.' Backed by the heavy influence of diplomats from
the Federation of Economic Organizations, Isaac Shapiro faced threats of
jail by the Japanese government as he was found in violation of the most
fundamental Japanese precept, namely, "no foreign law practices allowed
here."
In 1986, the foreign push for some sort of Japanese "internationalization" under the 1974 Trade Act resulted in Prime Minister Yasuhiro
Nakasone's adoption of a Japanese version of "lawyer friendly" laws.
The Foreign Lawyers Special Act of 1986 allowed American firms to
consult with Japanese firms who were breaking into American markets.
Under that agreement, Americans could provide business advice or litigation representation to the Japanese firms penetrating the American culture. However, the Japanese legislature failed to reciprocate. No American law firms could hire Japanese lawyers as consultants on Japanese
law. Thus, American firms were legally limited access to the resources
and talents that would make their service in Japan competitive.
Yet another example of the historical rejection of American attorneys in Japan is found in a Japanese law requiring foreign law firms in
Japan to be designated by a pejorative title. Under the 1986 law, US
firms had to identify their offices by the term "gaikokuho jimu
bengoshi." Literally translated, this Japanese phrase means "foreign law
attorney business." As Hall notes, however, jimu in Japanese connotes

5. In 1977, Isaac Shapiro, an attorney from the New York firm Milbank Tweed,
Hadley & McCloy went to Tokyo to open Japan's first foreign law firm. He gained the
support of the Japanese Foreign Ministry and the Federation of Economic Organizations.
Each organization expressed an honest concern with Japan's perception in the developing
international business and trade scene. However, such sentiment was not widely accepted,
and Shapiro met with threats of incarceration from the Japanese Federation of Bar Associations ("JFBA") (The JFBA acts as the gate-keeper for the Japanese legal environment. Historically, the JFBA has been quite hostile towards foreign attorneys.) Due to the
JFBA's persuasive complaints, the Japanese government did not approve any of the visa
applications that foreign firms had sent, dashing hopes that Shapiro would provide the
market breakthrough that much of the world anxiously awaited. Id. at 25.
1
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simplistic, clerical office work. The symbolism of this title, as required
by Japanese law, is significant. As Hall notes, these small cultural discriminations illustrate the dramatic double standard that so many American professionals face in Japan.
Some may say that the modem situation shows improvement. The
1994 Amendments, in addition to repealing the name requirement,
granted the right for American and Japanese law firms to form "joint enterprises." This law allows American firms to utilize Japanese lawyers.
However, the Japanese lawyers working for such firms may have no
"connection" with the American firm. 6 With such limited communication, many American firms feared a conflict with their ethical and professional duty to avoid conflicts of interest and protect attorney-client privilege, each of which would require thorough communication among the
firms. To date, only two out of forty five foreign law firms in Tokyo
have taken advantage of the business "opportunity" created by the new
law.
Perhaps Japan has a point. Maybe America's aggressive legal practice will deteriorate Japan's justice-seeking legal community. In such
case, Japan's barriers on legal access by foreigners could well be justified
because Japan was not acting solely for the purpose of discriminating
against foreigners, but rather to secure the safety and future of its legal
community. But, as Hall's experience shows, this rhetoric is not supported by reality. On the surface the Japanese may claim that their society is not litigious and serves human rights over corporate desire. However, despite these lofty ideals, the Japanese legal culture clearly suffers
from the same capitalist drives that define America's legal practice. A
Japanese lawyer whom Hall hired to handle litigation over an employment contract sums up his own reality. When asked about the sacrosanct
"rights, justice, fairness, reciprocity and principle" purported to be the
foundation upon which the Japanese based their legal culture, the Japanese lawyer concluded, "[T]he only legal scholars and practicing attorneys in Japan who use terms like that have been driven off to the left,
into the arenas of the socialist and communist parties, labor unions and
consumer groups." 7 Although Americans might argue that this situation
is strikingly similar to our own, such rhetoric is routinely used to support
the discriminating laws hindering the American legal practice in Japan.
Some may argue that Hall's criticisms of Japan's closed legal market
are nothing more than an insensitive attack on the roots of cultural difference. Yet, Hall is well aware of these shortcomings. By focusing on the

6. Id. at 28-29.
7. Id. at 35.
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discriminatory effects of Japan's closed legal market, however, Hall
hopes that the world will open its eyes to the double standard which operates in Japan. Moreover, Hall hopes that these double standards will
provide a framework from which to view the assumptions and realities of
a country struggling to keep its doors closed to outsiders while the world
clamors for open markets. Through the author's very strong evidence,
Cartels demands that the reader comprehend the very real biases that the
Japanese have against Americans, and understand the Japanese laws
against lawyers and other professionals as a consequence of these biases.
Kelly L. Shubic

